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NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
Leading Articles
SOME PRACTICAL ASPECTS OF OIL AND GAS TITLE
EXAMINATIONS IN NEBRASKA
Lowell C. Davis*
With the increasing expansion of oil and gas development in
Nebraska1 lawyers must be on the alert to recognize at least the
basic problems of the industry and the proper legal approach to
solve such problems. The topics here under discussion are too
broad to warrant more than a limited treatment. Eminent au-
thors and jurists have written volumes on the subjects that will
be discussed, footnote references to some of which will be made
herein. These authorities and others should be consulted for a
more detailed treatment of the matters herein discussed. It is
intended that this article will share with the bar some of the prac-
tical experiences, observations and research of Nebraska lawyers
engaged in the examination of oil titles.
In this state the oil and gas industry and the law pertaining
thereto is still in its infancy2. Therefore local judicial precedents
are limited. Solutions to our problems must be sought in the
decisions of other jurisdictions and the rules and reasoning weigh-
ed and applied to local cases. Occasionally this is not without dif-
ficulty since it has been said, "Oil and gas law has been in the
same fluid state as the subject matter with which it deals."'3 As
a result cases may be found to support almost any proposition.
Year after year the same cases are cited, and are either followed
Member of the Nebraska Bar.
1
1952 1953 1954
(1st 6 mos)
Number of test oil wells drilled: 96 137 95
Number of oil wells producing: 263 341 426
Number of test gas wells drilled: 11 10 11
Number of gas wells producing: 22 26 21
Total oil production (bbls) 2,660,222 6,093,614 3.534,243
Cumulative total 21,836,420
Total Gas Production (MCF) 5,302,000 6.518,446 3,045,600
Cumulative total 18,545,611
(The above information was furnished by E. C. Reed, State Geologist)
2Valentine Oil Co. v. Powers, 157 Neb. 71, 59 N.W.2d 150 (1953).
3 Johns, American Bar Association, Mineral Law Section (1940).
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or ignored, according to the predilection of the courts. Citation of
abundant authority in support of almost any possible construction
of instruments may be made from practically any state in the
Union.4
The oil and gas lease is the basic and fundamental contract
of the petroleum industry. There are two parties to this con-
tract-the landowner-lessor (and occasionally owners of mineral
interests), and the lessee. Some lease provisions definitely favor
the lessor while others benefit the lessee. The lawyer preparing
the lease should be acquainted with these various provisions so
he will be able to draft a contract for his client's best interests.
However, before the actual preparation of the lease, the validity
of the title must be determined and the necessary parties to the
lease must be ascertained. This requires an examination of a
certified abstract showing the chain of title to the land as it ap-
pears of record from the patent to the present date.5
Most lessees (especially the major companies) will require
such an examination but it is seldom that an attorney will insist
upon this absolutely necessary precaution where he is represent-
ing the landowner. His client, the landowner, will usually say he
owns the land and too often his attorney will be satisfied with
such opinion. By doing this the attorney does his client a grave
injustice for while the client may be the sole owner of the surface
(and this has been the main consideration of the title examiner
in the past) he may not be the sole owner of the mineral estate to
4 Moses, The Modern Oil and Gas Lease, Southwestern Legal Founda-
tion Second Annual Institute on Oil and Gas Law.
5 The oil industry is of necessity fast moving. Delays may be extreme-
ly costly and the time consumed in the preparation or extension and exami-
nation of an abstract may result in the loss of a valuable lease. To satisfy
a common request that title be approved "day before yesterday," the in-
dustry has occasionally resorted to abstracters' "Certificates of Title" which
show only the record title owner. These are generally made without war-
ranty or bond. But some attorneys will make a record title search from
the original records. The first approach is emphatically condemned for
reasons apparent to any qualified title examiner and the second tolerated
only if the attorney takes the time to examine fully each instrument of
record affecting title.
Frequently, in the height of an important "lease-play" lessees or per-
sons procuring leases will find that time prevents even the examination
of the record title. As a result some leases are taken upon the reliance
of statements of the prospective lessors as to the mineral ownership. This
practice, as well as other attempted "title short-cuts," has contributed to
the development in some of the oil producing states of "title-busters"-
persons who attempt to benefit from title defects in oil and gas leases.
A suggested approved form of oil and gas title opinion will be found
as an appendix to this article.
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which he proposes to lease and warrant title. Too frequently in
the past a careless abstracter or attorney has missed a mineral
reservation or exception or failed to consider properly the legal
effect of a conveyance in the chain of title insofar as it affects
the mineral estate. Oil titles are usually attacked or litigated ac-
cording to their prospective worth or importance. While it is an
old maxim among oil lawyers that "a producing well always clouds
a title and a dry hole cures it", a careful title examiner will know
his title and advise his client accordingly.
In examining the abstract of title pertaining to the mineral
estate there are many matters that must be considered in addition
to those relating solely to the surface estate. Some of these will
now be discussed, and others will by inference be readily identi-
fied in the hope that some of the pitfalls in oil title examinations
may be avoided. The basic considerations are of course the deter-
mination of the quantity and quality of the mineral estate and the
necessary persons to be joined as lessors.
1. THE PATENT.
The patent, the importance of which is too often overlooked,
is the primary link in the chain of title. Some patents contain
a specific reservation of all minerals6 but many of the earlier
abstracts fail to show this reservation, the abstracter's certifi-
cate reciting that it shows "all matters on file or of record...
that in any manner affect the title .... " The present Uniform
Abstracter's Certificate, approved by the Nebraska Title Associa-
tion, certifies "all instruments of writing on record or on file (ex-
cept such instruments filed in the chattel mortgage records) ...
that affect the title to said real estate; that said instruments con-
tain no unusual conditions, limitations, recitals or covenants, ex-
cept as noted." Today most abstracters in preparing an abstract
which contains the patent entry are careful to note a mineral
reservation; however, where they merely extend an existing ab-
stract containing a prior patent entry, the present certificate is
not applicable or sufficient. A careful examiner should require
either (a) a photostatic certified copy of the recorded patent or
(b) a new patent entry certified by the present approved certifi-
cate.
Another patent problem is the mineral exclusion provision
6Stock-raising Homesteads Act, 39 Stat. 864 (1916). 43 U.S.C. § 299
(1946).
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
contained in patents to the Union Pacific Railway Co.7 This pro-
vision has been held to be void and of no effect s and should be
disregarded by the examiner.
2. THE CHAIN OF TITLE FROM THE PATENT TO THE
LEASE.
In this part of the title examination the examiner must con-
sider not only the ordinary conveyancing problems necessary for
a determination of marketable title but in addition others that
are peculiar to the mineral estate.
(a) Ownership of Minerals in Railroad Right of Way.
In examining title to a railroad right of way, the first step
is to determine who owns the mineral rights. Basically there
can be but little argument that if the railroad company owns the
fee to the right of way as distinguished from a mere easement,
it owns and may exploit the minerals therein.9
Generally a railroad acquires its right of way by (1) legisla-
tive grant, (2) purchase or (3) condemnation. An example of
acquisition of right of way by legislative grant is the Union Paci-
fic grant,10 which authorized the construction of that railroad,
granted a right of way through the public lands 200 feet in
width on each side of the railroad where it passed over public
lands and granted every alternate section of public land, desig-
nated by odd numbers, to the amount of five alternate sections
per mile on each side of the railroad. It is very generally recog-
nized that the grant of the odd numbered sections under these
Acts granted the fee.1
Some question has arisen, however, in regard to the title to
the minerals in the right of way in the even numbered sections.
The authorities indicate that, absent an abandonment, the right of
way granted by these and other similar acts prior to 1875 was
7 The exclusion reads as follows: "Excluding and excepting from the
transfer by these presents all mineral lands should any such be found to
exist in the tracts described in the foregoing, but this exclusion and ex-
ception, according to the terms of the statute, shall not be construed to
Include coal and iron lands."
s Burke v. Southern Pacific R.R., 234 U.S. 669 (1914).
9 See 44 Am. Jur. 149.
1012 Stat. 489 (1862), as amended, 13 Stat. 356 (1864), 14 Stat. 79
(1866).
11 In Great Northern Ry. v. United States, 315 U.S. 262, 278 (1942) the
court said: "When Congress made outright grants to a railroad of alter-
nate sections of public lands along the right of way, there is little reason
to suppose that it intended to give only an easement in the right of way
granted in the same act."
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"the land itself" or a "limited" or "conditional fee subject to re-
verter" which included the underlying minerals. 12  This "limited
fee doctrine" appears to have been recognized by the Nebraska
Supreme Court.13
Right of way grants to railroads under the General Right of
Way Act of 1875 1 granted only an easement and therefore ex-
cluded the mineral rights.', It is apparent therefore that the
basic consideration in the determination of the ownership of min-
erals in rights of way acquired by legislative grant is the language
of and interpretation placed upon the granting act.
Generally, the purchase of railroad right of way has been by
(1) warranty or quitclaim deed or (2) "Right-of-Way deed."",
A determination of the estate conveyed by such deeds has given
rise to much litigation resulting in a considerable conflict of au-
thority. The title examiner must give careful consideration to
the exact phraseology of the instrument for the determination of
the estate created, e.g., whether a fee title or an easement. This
must be ascertained from the intention of the parties as shown
12 Stuart v. Union Pacific R.R., 227 U.S. 342 (1913); Holland Co. v.
Northern Pacific R.R., 214 Fed. 920 (9th Cir. 1914); People v. Tulare
Packing Co., 25 Cal. App.2d 717, 78 P.2d 763 (1938); Southern Pacific
R.R. v. Ambler Grain and Milling Co., 66 F.2d 670 (9th Cir. 1933);
Barnes v. Southern Pacific R.R, 16 F.2d 100 (9th Cir. 1926); Union Paci-
fic R.R. v. Davenport, 102 Kan. 513, 170 Pac. 993 (1918); United States
v. Illinois Central R.R.. 187 F.2d 374 (7th Cir. 1951).
A suit is now pending in the United States District Court for the
District of Wyoming (United States v. Union Pacific R.R. (Civil No. 3736))
wherein the Government seeks to quiet title to the minerals underlying
the right of way in an even numbered section of land in 'Wyoming and to
enjoin the railroad company from removing, leasing or otherwise disposing
of the minerals in the right of way. The fee to the balance of the sub-
division in issue is in the Government, having never been patented. Dis-
position of and decision in this case should assist in clarifying any uncer-
tainties in the authorities pertaining to this question.
13Etheredge v. C.B. & Q. R.R., 105 Neb. 778, 181 N.W. 928 (1921);
AMcLucas v. St. Joseph & G.I. R.R., 67 Neb. 612, 97 N.W. 312 (1903);
Rider v. Burlington & M. R.R., 14 Neb. 120, 15 N.W. 371 (1883).
1418 Stat. 482 (1875), 43 U.S.C. § 934 (1952).
15 Great Northern Ry. v. United States, 315 U.S. 262 (1942).
16 "Right of way deeds" are common in western Nebraska. They usu-
ally contain substantially the following language: "... do hereby grant,
bargain, sell and convey unto... Railroad Company... the following des-
cribed real estate... a strip of ground 100 feet wide, it being 50 feet on
each side of the center line of the railroad of said company as located up-
on (described land) to have and to hold the same unto the said railroad
company, its successors and assigns forever. And in addition to the right
of way described above we hereby grant, for ourselves and our heirs and
assigns the right to said railroad company to erect and maintain a snow
fence.. ." These deeds do not generally contain a warranty clause.
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by the instrument itself and in the event of ambiguity considera-
tion must be given to the circumstances surrounding the transac-
tion. In such cases it is advisable to require either that the ab-
stract contain a photostatic copy of the conveyance or the exami-
ner should personally examine in detail all of the provisions of
the recorded deed.
The general rule is that where the instrument conveys a strip,
piece, parcel or tract of "land" or "ground" and does not contain
additional language limiting the estate conveyed there is a grant
in fee. But where the deed conveys a right of way rather than
a strip or tract of land only an easement is granted.17
Two Nebraska cases have construed such deeds. In the first
case's a grant of a strip of land 100 feet wide across certain land
"for right of way and for operating its railroad only" was held
to be a mere easement, the quoted words limiting the rights of
the grantee to a mere easement. In the second case19 a grant of
described real estate "for terminal and railway purposes and
uses" was held to convey a fee and in the absence of a provision
for reversion or forfeiture, the quoted words were not a limita-
tion on the estate conveyed but only a description of the use to
which the land was to be put.
It is difficult to reconcile these two cases for in neither
deed did there appear a reverter clause-a factor that was ap-
parently given controlling weight in the latter case-and both
grants were of land to be used for a specified purpose. It is sub-
mitted that the preferable rule is contained in the second case
and represents the weight of authority. The significant question
is whether the land is conveyed or merely a use of the land. If
the deed conveys a strip of land, even though the purpose be
recited, it should be construed as conveying a fee.20
The law seems well settled in Nebraska that a railroad com-
pany acquiring a right of way by condemnation proceedings ac-
quires only an easement and the fee title, together with the min-
erals, remains in the servient owner. 21
The majority of railroad right of way acquisitions occurred
many years ago and much of the land over which the railroads
ran has been the subject of many subsequent conveyances. A
very troublesome title problem is created in cases where the rail-
17 See extensive Notes, 132 A.L.R. 142 (1941) and 84 A.L.R. 271 (1933).
Is Blakely v. Chicago, K. & N. R.R., 46 Neb. 272, 64 N.W. 972 (1895).
19 Carr v. Miller, 105 Neb. 623, 181 N.W. 557 (1921); cf. George v.
Pracheil, 92 Neb. 81. 137 N.WV. 880 (1912), where the grant contained a
reverter provision.
20 Carter Oil Co. v. Welker, 112 F.2d 299 (7th Cir. 1940).
21 Roberts v. Sioux City & P. R.R., 73 Neb. 8, 102 N.W. 60 (1905); see
also Notes, 33 Neb. L. Rev. 640 (1954), and 36 A.L.R.2d 1424 (1954).
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road has acquired only an easement with the fee title to the land
and the minerals remaining in the owner of the servient estate
and the land is thereafter conveyed by deed purporting to "ex-
cept" or "reserve" the land or interest so conveyed for railroad
uses.22 Again there is a conflict in the authorities, with one line
of cases holding that by such language the grantor reserved or
excepted the fee to the right of way23. The other view argues that
the exception or reservation was merely to protect the grantor
against a claim on the covenants of warranty in the deed based
upon the existence of an outstanding easement over the land at
the time it was conveyed and not as indicating any intention to
reserve the fee to the land used as a right of way, which, of course,
normally consists of a long, narrow strip which would by itself
be of little value to the original owner of the tract from which it
was taken. This line of cases hold that the fee to the right of
way passes by the conveyance. 21 The Nebraska Supreme Court
22 Typical illustrations of such grants are in notes 23 and 24 infra.
23 Spencer v. Wabash R.R., 132 Iowa 129, 109 N.W. 453 (1906) ("ex-
cepting a strip of land 100 feet wide heretofore deeded to the Iowa Central
Railroad..."); Hall v Wabash Ry. 133 Iowa 714, 110 N.W. 1039
(1907) ("excepting the part occupied by the Iowa Central Railroad Com-
pany."); Reynolds v. Gaertner, 117 Mich. 532, 76 N.W. 3 (1898) ("ex-
cept 2.46 acres to the Chicago & Canada Southern Railroad"); Collins v.
Baird, 125 Kan. 330, 263 Pac. 1048 (1928) ("except a strip of land...
heretofore conveyed to said Interurban Ry. Co.")
24 Carlson v. Duluth Short Line Co., 38 Minn. 305, 37 N.W. 341 (1888)
("reserving... a strip of land 150 feet wide, and any greater width, where
necessary, for a right of way.. ."); Mahar v. Grand Rapids Terminal Ry.,
174 Mich. 138, 140 N.W. 535 (1913) ("excepting the conditional right of
way heretofore granted to the Ludington Railroad Co."); Barker v. Lash-
brook, 128 Kan. 595, 279 Pac. 12 (1929) ("less... 3.81 acres taken by
the K.C.W. & N. Ry., containing 117.19 acres more or less."); Roxana
Petroleum Corp. v. Corn, 28 F.2d 168 (8th Cir. 1928) ("except that part
of out-lot 9 ... heretofore deeded to railroad for right of way."); Shell
Petroleum Corp. v. Hollow, 70 F.2d 811 (10th Cir. 1934) ("excepting,
however, and not included in this grant, one acre ... deeded to School Dis-
trict No. 29."); Shell Petroleum Corp. v. Ward, 100 F.2d 778 (5th Cir.
1939) ("except therefrom 5.6 acres taken up by right of way of the Neches
Canal Company lateral, making 156.4 acres herein and hereby conveyed.");
Kansas City Southern Ry. Co. v. Marietta Corp., 102 F.2d 603 (5th Cir.
1939) ("less a right of way 100 feet in width reserved for railroad.");
see also note in 139 A.L.R. 1355 (1942) and cases cited in 2 Summers,
Oil and Gas § 229 (19-38). In Jennings v. Amerada Petroleum Co., 179
Okla. 561, 66 P.2d 1069 (1937) it is said: "The recitals 'less the right
of way' and 'except right of way' in the granting clause of a deed have a
well defined and accepted meaning and contain no element of uncertainty
or ambiguity. Thereunder the grantor conveys his entire interest in the
servient estate and at the same time expressly recognizes and acknowledges
the dominant estate."
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has not specifically passed on this type of case but aided by statu-
tory canons of construction25 it seems that the doctrine announc-
ed in the last mentioned line of cases is to be favored in the ab-
sence of clear and unequivocal language in the grant to the con-
trary.
It has been previously noted that the Union Pacific Railroad
Company acquired by legislative grant the fee title to certain odd
numbered sections. 26 These lands were thereafter conveyed by
grants purporting to reserve a certain portion of the land as and
for a right of way.2 7 Here again the question arises as to whether
a fee to the land or an easement over the land is retained by the
railroad company-grantor by such a provision. Likewise the Ne-
braska Supreme Court has never specifically passed upon such a
deed or construed a similar reservation provision. The problem
in this type of case is analogous to but differs in important de-
tails from the cases previously discussed. Here again the courts
are in disagreement.
One line of cases, (the reservation clauses varying in some
respects from that noted below) hold that such a provision re-
serves merely an easement and does not except the fee.28 A con-
trary rule which seems more applicable and in point with the
25 Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 76-104, 76-106 (Reissue 1950).
26 Great Northern Ry. v. United States, 315 U.S. 262 (1942).
27 An example of this reservation clause follows: Grants (described
land) "containing according to the U. S. survey thereof 1120 acres, more
or less ... reserving, -however, to the said Union Pacific Railway Company,
all that portion of the land hereby conveyed (if any such there be) which
lies within lines drawn parallel with and 200 feet on each side distant
from, the center line of its road, as now constructed and any greater
width when necessary permanently to include all its cuts, embankments,
and ditches and other works necessary to secure and protect its main-
line ...."
2S Carlson v. Duluth Short Line Ry., 38 Minn. 305, 37 N.W. 341 (1888);
Hedderly v. Johnson, 44 Minn. 443, 44 N.W. 527 (1890); Bendikson v.
Great Northern Ry., 80 Minn. 332, 83 N.W. 194 (1900); Biles v. Tacoma,
0. & G.H. Ry., 5 Wash. 509, 32 Pac. 211 (1893). It is important to note
that in these cases the conveyance preceded the location and construction
of the railroad and there was no particular portion of the land identified
or described, as it doubtless would have been had it been the intention to
except the fee. This distinguishing fact is noted in the cases reaching a
contrary result. Such a distinction is, however not accorded much weight
in the Bendikson case. In Bruegger v. Cartier, 29 N.D. 575, 151 N.W. 34
(1915) a plaintiff contracted to give good title to a tract of land that he
had previously purchased from a railroad company, but containing a reser-
vation similar to that in the Bendikson case. The court refused to pass on
the validity of the clause but on the authority of the Bendikson case held
that there was reasonable doubt as to the validity of plaintiff's title.
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Union Pacific example in Nebraska holds such a clause to be an
exception of the fee rather than a reservation of an easement. 9
The distinction between the two lines of cases is shown by the
following language of the court in the last cited case:
In view of the fact that the main railroad line had been con-
structed across the quarter section and actually existed at a time
prior to the execution of the deed containing the clause now in
dispute, thus giving definite location and identification to the
strip to be affected thereby, we are not prepared to say that the
court below erred in construing such clause to be an exception
of the parcel rather than the reservation of an easement over
the same.
It is important that the examiner therefore consider three
factors in construing such clauses: (1) the language of the clause,
(2) whether the railroad was in existence and its line located prior
to the execution of the deed, and (3) the intention of the parties
as ascertained from the language of the entire deed.
It is apparent that the problems discussed with regard to
railroad rights of way are common with those in cases involving
conveyances purporting to except or reserve lands granted for
school sites, streets, highways, canals and irrigation ditches, to
mention but a few.30
(b) Lands Granted for Limited Purposes-Reverter
Clauses.
A previous article has pointed to title problems in cases in-
volving conveyances for limited purposes 31 and no attempt will
be made here to elaborate on those cases, except as to the oil title
problems in such conveyances containing a reverter clause.32 Gen-
erally, the abstract or the records will not contain evidence suf-
ficient to determine whether or not, or when, the condition has
arisen whereby the reverter has occurred. Therefore, it is im-
29 Newport v. Hatton, 195 Cal. 132, 231 Pac. 987 (1925). It is im-
portant to note the similarity between the reservation clause in this case
and that cited in note 27 supra-"Excepting and reserving, however, for
railroad purposes a strip of land 400 feet wide lying equally on each side
of the tract of the railroad of said company, or any branch railroad now
or hereafter constructed on said lands ...... The Union Pacific construc-
tion was completed through Nebraska in 1868.
30 See also Elrod v. Heirs, Devisees, 156 Neb. 269, 55 N.W.2d 673 (1952),
33 Neb. L. Rev. 628 (1954).
31 Comment, 33 Neb. L. Rev. 628 (1954).
32 Typical of this type of clause is the following: "sells and conveys
said tract of land to be used for school purposes and in case said second
party shall cease to use said land as herein provided, then said land shall
revert to said first party .... "
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portant that the examiner satisfy himself as to whether the con-
dition has arisen-this is generally done by a recorded affidavit
setting forth the facts.
The Nebraska Supreme Court in Ohm v. Clear Creek Drain-
age District33 held such a conveyance to create an estate in fee
simple subject to a condition subsequent:
The deed vested in the district all the rights of a fee simple
owner of real estate until it ceases to use the land for the pur-
poses specified and divestment of its estate by re-entry. Until
such termination it has the same rights and powers in connec-
tion with the estate conveyed by the deed as if the condition did
not exist.
The court rejected the contention that the estate which had
been created was a fee simple determinable and would therefore
automatically terminate upon the occurrence of a stated event.
Thus it is generally held that so long as the condition is not broken
and the land continues to be used for the stated purpose the min-
eral fee is vested in the original grantee, and he has the power to
lease it for oil and gas purposes.34
Such a condition subsequent, until broken, runs with the land,
and at least in cases where the reversion is to "the grantor, heirs
and assigns" such grantor, or his heirs, if the grantor is dead,
may claim a reversion of the estate, and can maintain an action
in ejectment to recover itA5
Under the common law the right of re-entry in the event of
a breach of a condition subsequent is not alienable or assignable
before the breach. It is the rule in some states that a conveyance
by the grantor, after his grant of a fee subject to a condition sub-
sequent, of the same land to another has the effect of destroying
the condition, extinguishing the interest in the land remaining in
the grantor upon the earlier conveyance, and leaving the grantee
33 153 Neb. 428, 45 N.W.2d 117 (1950) ("... to be used for ditching,
diking and drainage purposes, and if abandoned or not used for that pur-
pose to revert to ... the grantors, their heirs and assigns."). But see
George v. Pracheil, 92 Neb. 81, 137 N.W. 880 (1912), where a deed con-
veyed a strip of land to a railroad company and provided "in case said
railroad company do not construct their road through said tract or shall
after construction permanently abandon the route through said tract, then
the same shall revert to and become reinvested in the said grantors, heirs
and assigns .... " This was held to be a conveyance of a mere easement
subject to a condition subsequent.
3 -Regular Predestinarian Baptist Church of Pleasant Grove v. Parker,
373 Ill. 607, 27 N.E.2d 522 (1950).
35Jetter v. Lyon, 70 Neb. 429. 97 N.W. 596 (1903); George v. Pracheil,
92 Neb. 81, 137 N.W. 880 (1912).
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with an absolute unconditional fee.36 This point does not appear
to have been passed upon by the Nebraska court since it was not
in issue nor discussed in the Ohm37 case. In fact it would appear
that the rule against assignability of the right of re-entry for
breach of a condition subsequent has been abrogated by the Ne-
braska Uniform Property Act.38 If this act does abrogate the
rule, then the owner of the fee at the time of the breach of the
condition subsequent would have the right to re-enter and claim
the reversion of the estate. This right, however, is one that could
be extinguished by adverse possession, limitations or laches.
It is therefore important for the examiner to satisfy himself
as to (1) whether a breach of the condition has occurred, (2) the
date of the breach, and (3) the possessors of the property after
the breach.
(c) Ownership of Minerals in River Beds.
Much of the potential oil land in western and central Ne-
braska is traversed by rivers and streams, notably the North and
South Platte Rivers. Consequently, it is the duty of the oil title
examiner to determine the ownership of the minerals underlying
such rivers and streams.
The law is well settled in Nebraska that the state does not
hold title to the river beds; instead the riparian owners acquire
title at right angles to the thread of the stream.3 Such title in-
cludes ownership of the underlying minerals with the right to
lease and explore the same.40 The extent or area of such owner-
ship involves a determination of the location of the thread of the
stream, or the center of the channel. The Nebraska court has
established a definite guide and declared the thread of a non-
navigable river to be based upon the water line at its lowest stage.4 1
36 See Notes, 109 A.L.R. 1148 (1937), 117 A.L.R. 563 (1938) and 135
A.L.R. 576 (1941).
37 153 Neb. 428, 45 N.W. 2d 117 (1950).
38Neb. Rev. Stat. § 76-101 et. seq. (Reissue 1950).
39 Theis v. Platte Valley Public Power & Irrigation Dist., 137 Neb. 344,
289 N.W. 386 (1939); Kinkead v. Turgeon, 74 Neb. 573, 104 N.W. 1061
(1905).
4o Glassmire, Law of Oil and Gas Leases and Royalties § 82 (2d ed.
1935).
4lHardt v. Orr, 142 Neb. 460, 6 N.W.2d 589 (1942). The brevity of
this discussion should not indicate the simplicity of the problems Involved,
or that in practice the rules of law are necessarily followed. While it is
true that the riparian ownership extends at right angles to the thread
of the stream, still in some cases the riparian owner will merely extend
his section line fence straight out into the stream thereby creating a tri-
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It might well behoove the examiner in such cases to require a
survey or specific proof as to the location of the thread of the
channel.
(d) Unreleased Oil and Gas Leases of Record.
During the past decade there has been sporadic oil and gas
leasing activity throughout much of the present exploration area.
Little or no development has been undertaken and many leases
have expired by reason of non-development or nonpayment of
rentals. In many instances, however, such oil and gas leases re-
main unreleased of record and as a result constitute a cloud on
the title to the mineral estate.
As to leases in "wildcat areas", frequently a lawyer, with the
acceptance of the lessee, will certify title, even though the title
is clouded, by requiring a recordable affidavit of non-development
and nonpayment of rentals.42 It is preferable, however, to obtain
a release of such a lease, if possible, and if time permits, either by
a recorded release43 or a marginal release4 as provided in the Ne-
braska statutes. The neglect or refusal of the owner of such
forfeited lease to surrender and release it subjects him to a statu-
tory liability for damages. 4r However, this remedy is seldom used.
If a voluntary release cannot be obtained and if an affidavit
of non-development and nonpayment of rentals is not deemed suf-
ficient, the examiner should require compliance with the statutory
forfeiture proceedings. 46
(e) Legislative Restrictions Governing Oil and Gas Leases.
angular segment between the extended fence line which would be at right
angles to the thread of the stream. This results in ownership of such
segment depending upon adverse possession rather than the rules of law
announced by the court. Here again the necessity of a survey is important.
42 Form of such affidavit is found in 5 Am. Jur. Legal Forms § 5:1839.
43Neb. Rev. Stat. § 57-201 (Reissue 1952).
44Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 57-206, 57-207 (Reissue 1952).
45Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 57-205, 57-209 (Reissue 1952).
46Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 57-202 to 57-204 (Reissue 1952). The provisions
for publication of notice for three weeks and a waiting time of twenty
days following service or publication of notice disregard the realities of
the fast moving oil industry. It has been demonstrated in practice that
in cases where such procedure has been invoked notification seldom is
given of a claim that the lease is in effect (§ 57-204). The time required
to process the surrender should be reduced by legislative amendment; this
recommendation is contained in the current report of the Nebraska State
Bar Association Committee on Oil and Gas Law.
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In several localities in western Nebraska production is being
obtained from lands in close proximity to or contiguous with the
corporate limits of towns and villages. It is reasonable to assume
that such examples will increase as development progresses. As
a result it is necessary to anticipate some of the legal problems
which may confront the title examiner if properties within a
corporate limit become the proposed subject of an oil and gas
lease. In such an instance it is important to examine the zoning
ordinances and local laws to determine whether or not valid re-
strictions have been imposed which prohibit or regulate the drill-
ing of wells within the corporate limits.
It is recognized that the privilege of producing oil and gas
from one's property is inherent in ownership and may be fully
exercised unless legally restricted or prohibited by enactments
which protect the public welfare. So where a state or munici-
pality, through a valid exercise of its police power, restricts and
regulates the production of oil and gas from certain areas of land,
the landowner's privileges of producing oil and gas and his powers
of leasing the land for those purposes are restricted.4 7
(f) Boundaries and the Survey.
A large amount of litigation has developed in Nebraska with
regard to boundaries of land and the ownership of marginal tracts.
Generally the record title will not disclose facts sufficient to put
a prospective oil and gas lessee or the title examiner on notice as
to any matters affecting the boundaries of the land or discrep-
ancies in quantity. Faced with uncertainty many oil title exam-
iners require a survey which definitely fixes the boundaries and
determines the acreage of the tract of land. This precaution has
proved practical in western Nebraska because of lost, destroyed
or disputed monuments coupled with the acquiesence of adjoining
landowners for long periods of time as to division lines which vary
with official surveys. It is well known that in certain parts of
western Nebraska some sections contain an excess or deficiency
of as much as 160 acres.48
47 Typical cases announcing these rules are: Amis v. Bryan Petroleum
Corp., 185 Okla. 206, 90 P.2d 936 (1939); Cooke v. Westgate-Greenland
Oil Co., 185 Okla. 209, 90 P.2d 940 (1939), and Inland Development Co.
v. Beveridge, 185 Okla. 174, 90 P.2d 942 (1939).
48 Township 16, Range 51 in Cheyenne County, is a typical example of
this situation. The original government survey made in 1869 established
certain corners and division lines but with the passing of time monuments
were lost or destroyed and boundaries were more-or-less arbitrarily estab-
lished by officials. It has in fact been established that no interior govern-
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Boundary lines were early established in many instances by
fences or other visible indicia of separation based upon a mis-
taken assumption that such boundaries were the true govern-
mental dividing lines, and such fences have been recognized by
the adjoining land owners over the years as being in fact the
dividing line between their respective properties. In these cases
it has been held that if no intervening rights or claims arose, the
excess acreage would be divided according to the respective acre-
age of each tract as shown by the survey. But when a fence is
constructed as a boundary between two properties, and where the
parties claim ownership of the land up to the fence for the full
statutory period and are not interrupted in their possession or con-
trol during that time, they will, by adverse possession, gain title
to such land as may have been improperly enclosed as their own
land.4 9
The impact or significance of situations of this kind which
affect the mineral estate is apparent and fully justifies the re-
quirement of a survey disclosing governmental corners and bound-
aries as well as the location of fences or other evidence of physical
separation.50 If indication of a variance in the acreage from the
governmental subdivision is found or suspicioned it should be speci-
fically pointed out by the title examiner so that appropriate lease
provisions may be adopted.
(g) Determination of Necessary Parties-Lessors.
Equally important with the quantity and quality of the min-
eral estate subject to lease is a determination of the necessary
ment corners were placed by the original governmnt surveyors in Town-
ship 16 and only three exterior government corners located. Subsequent
surveys in 1918 (Bordwell), and 1928 (Simmons) relocated the boundaries,
resulting in considerable discrepancies in acreage. See State v. Cheyenne
County, 123 Neb. 1, 241 N.W. 747 (1932).
49 Typical of cases announcing this rule are Romine v. West. 134" Neb.
274, 278 N.W". 490 (1938); Johnston v. Aden, 109 Neb. 625, 192 N.W.
220 (1923); Pfeifer v. Scottsbluff Miortgage Loan Co., 105 Neb. 621, 181
N.W. 533 (1921).
50 In Carter Oil Co. v. Stewart, 36 F. Supp. 121 (E.D. Ill. 1941), where
an original fence was constructed by adjoining landowners to establish
uncertain and unascertained division line, which was accepted and ac-
quiesced in by them, it was held that such fence line and not the line fixed
in accordance with a government survey constituted the boundary line,
and hence ownership of an oil well would be determined by the line of
such fence and not the line fixed in accordance with the government sur-
vey. Other illustration cases are found in 2 Summers, Oil and Gas § 229
(2d ed. 1938). See also 3 Oil and Gas Reporter (1950).
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parties-lessors. A full interest, valid lease can be obtained only
by the joint execution by all cotenants appearing in the chain of
title. Some illustrations of the problems here presented will now
be discussed.
(1) Deceased Persons, Beneficiaries of a Trust, Minors
and Incompetent Persons.
Oil and gas leases executed by minors or incompetent persons
are at least voidable so the examiner should be on the alert to
recognize or investigate any circumstances appearing in the chain
of title which indicate minority or incompetency. The Nebraska
statutes specifically authorize an executor, administrator, guardi-
an or trustee to execute oil and gas leases covering lands owned
by a deceased person, beneficiary of a trust, minor or incompet-
ent.51 The statutory procedure should be strictly followed.5 2
In cases where there are unknown owners, heirs, devisees, or
legatees of deceased owners, who claim or appear to have some
interest in, rights or title, or lien upon the real estate sought to
be leased, additional procedural requirements must be followed.53
(2) Contingent Remaindermen.
The oil title examiner is frequently confronted with the prob-
This identical case was recently encountered in the development of
one of the most prolific oil and gas leases in western Nebraska. The lease
covered and described a specific governmental tract and did not contain a
"coverall clause" or what has sometimes been referred to as a "Mother
Hubbard Clause." Before actual production, it was discovered that the
landowner, because of a boundary fence and his occupancy and use of the
land thereto, actually owned several acres in the adjoining governmental
tract, sufficient in size to lease and drill. Fortunately, the problem was
amicably adjusted but not without much apprenhension on the part of the
producing oil and gas lessee.
5iNeb. Rev. Stat. § 57-210 (Cum. Supp. 1953).
52Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 57-211, 57-212 (Cum. Supp. 1953). Section 57-
212 vests the manner of notice of hearing in the discretion of the court.
Generally the trial judges in western Nebraska have allowed a hearing
instanter following personal service upon the minor, incompetent, bene-
ficiary or adjudicated heirs or devisees. Where notice by publication is
directed, a single publication is generally deemed sufficient with hearing
one week or ten days thereafter except in cases wherein it is alleged that
there are unknown heirs under § 57-212.01.
53 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 57-212.01 (Reissue 1952). It is submitted that
the additional procedural requirements under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-321,
517 and 518 are neither necessary nor practical and that this statute should
be amended to provide that the court or a judge thereof shall set the
matter down for hearing and direct to what persons and in what manner
notice of such hearing shall be given as is now provided in § 57-212.
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lem of a contingent remainder when he attempts to obtain a full
lease of land. An example of this problem is as follows: Title is
vested in A for life with the remainder interest in his children.
A, still living, has certain children alive. There is a possibility
that after born children may have some interest in the fee.
In such a case the statutes provide that the life tenant may
apply to the district court of the county wherein the land is located
for the appointment of a trustee, under bond, to lease the land
for oil and gas development purposes. 4 The procedure to obtain
such authority is substantially the same as provided for obtaining
permission to mortgage real estate.55 It does not appear that any
notice is necessary preceding the appointment of the trustee, who
may be appointed instanter with his bond fixed and approved.
The trustee then files a petition for authority to lease the interests
of the contingent remaindermen, an order is made fixing a time
for hearing and notice is published for three successive weeks
prior to the hearing.50 It is noted that in such cases the bonus
and rentals shall be paid to the life tenant "or other person en-
titled thereto" while the royalties are to be paid entirely to the
trustee for investment until the ultimate taker is determined.
Then the funds are paid over to such ultimate taker and the trust
is closed. The income or interest from such royalty investments
is payable to the life tenant "or other person entitled thereto." 57
(3) Life Tenants and Remaindermen.
A conveyance by a life tenant, purporting to pass the fee
or the entire interest in the property involved, operates validly
as a conveyance of the life estate of the grantor, and the life estate
passes to the grantee designated, but the remainder also purported
54 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 57-222 (Reissue 1952). Where this situation is
encountered in the chain of title the examiner should require an additional
showing regarding the age, marital status, etc., of the life tenant. Sup-
pose the life tenant is a widow, age 80, with two living children. The
possibility of additional children is, to say the least, remote, and in such
case a recordable affidavit setting forth the facts is generally considered
sufficient.
5Neb. Rev. Stat. § 57-223 (Reissue 1952). An oil and gas lease is in
legal effect a conveyance of a property interest. It is anomalous that a
procedure provided for permission to mortgage real estate rather than that
for sale should have been adopted. See Ellis v. Rudy, 253 S.W.2d 382
(Ky. 1952).
GONeb. Rev. Stat. §§ 30-1202 to 30-1206 (Reissue 1948). Again it is
suggested that these procedural requirements are neither necessary nor
practical. To expedite the proceedings the court should be permitted to
direct to what persons and in what mabaner notice of such hearing should
be given. See § 57-212.
57Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 57-223, 57-224 (Reissue 1952).
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to be conveyed is unaffected, and the grantee ordinarily acquires
no interest by virtue of such conveyance against a remainder-
man.58
In contrast to this rule, however, it is generally recognized
that neither the life tenant nor the remaindermen can singly make
a valid oil and gas lease, and one who procures a lease executed
by the life tenant alone thereby acquires no right to exploit the
leasehold. If he attempts to do so, the remaindermen may be
entitled to relief, not only against him, but also against the lessor.
It follows that for a lease to be valid it must be executed by both
the life tenant and the remaindeirnen.50
(4) Cotenants - Tenants in Common.
To obtain a valid full-leasehold lease it is obvious that all
cotenants must join in the execution of the instrument. Here the
examiner must keep in mind that there can be a cotenancy in the
mineral estate which is separate and distinct from the ownership
of the surface estate. For example, a landowner may execute
various types of mineral or royalty conveyances prior to the execu-
tion of an oil and gas lease, thus making such mineral-grantees
cotenants with power to lease.60 It is important that the examiner
makes a full examination of any such mineral conveyances in order
to determine whether the grant is sufficient to carry with it a
power or right to lease.
While there is some conflict in the authorities, the majority
view is that any cotenant who executes an oil and gas lease
makes the lessee a cotenant of the other tenants, entitles him to
possession of the entire premises, and authorizes him to extract
gas and oil subject to the right of the nonsigning cotenants to an
accounting of the profits.6' The developing cotenant cannot render
the other tenants personally liable. Therefore, if the venture is
unsuccessful, the developing cotenant must bear the loss. But if
it is successful, the developing cotenant is entitled only to be reim-
bursed proportionately from production for the reasonable cost of
drilling, operating and marketing.6 2
It is important to note that the Nebraska Statutes now speci-
fically provide that all tenants in common, joint tenants, or lessees
of any estate in land or interest therein, or of any mineral, coal,
petroleum or gas rights, may be compelled to make or suffer parti-
5sMoffitt v. Reed, 124 Neb. 410, 246 N.W. 853 (1933); Bohrer v.
Davis, 94 Neb. 367, 143 N.W. 209 (1913).
59 24 Am. Jur. 527.
60 3 Summers, Oil and Gas § 599 (2d ed. 1938).
61 24 Am. Jur. 526.
62 See Notes in 40 A.L.R. 1400 (1926) and 91 A.L.R. 205 (1934).
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tion 3 which may be either in kind or by sale and division of the
proceeds.
(h) Application of Nebraska Statutes.
Title problems peculiar to the law of oil and gas add to those
common problems in the examination of land titles generally, and
in some instances differ in various states due to statutory differ-
ences and interpretations. It is essential that the title examiner
have a thorough knowledge of the statutes pertaining to real prop-
erty and give them full consideration.
The stability of titles in Nebraska has been greatly improved
by the adoption of The Uniform Property Act in 1941,4 The Mar-
ketable Title Act in 194765 and The Standards of Title Examina-
tion Act in 1947.66 These acts, as well as the various curative
laws, should be crystal clear and foremost in the examiner's mind
at all times. A realistic and practical adherence to these laws
will continue to contribute to the ultimate demise of that proverb-
ial nuisance-"the over meticulous title examiner. ' 67
(i) The Marketable Title Act.
No attempt will be made to discuss in any detail the Nebraska
statutes above referred to other than The Marketable Title Act.
The purpose of this Act is to simplify and facilitate real estate
title transactions by allowing persons to deal with the record
title owner-any person, having legal capacity to own real
estate, who has an unbroken chain of title to any interest in real
estate by himself and his immediate or remote grantors under a
deed of conveyance which has been recorded for a period of twenty-
two years or longer, and is in possession of such real estate. Thus
it appears that two prerequisites are necessary to invoke the appli-
cation of the Act: (1) unbroken chain of title for twenty-two
years, and (2) possession of the real estate. If these appear, such
record title owner holds free and clear of all interest, claims, and
charges whatever, the existence of which depends in whole or in
part upon any act, transaction, event, or omission that occurred
tventy-two years or more prior thereto, and all such interests,
claims, and charges affecting such interest in real estate are
barred and not enforceable at law or equity unless notice is given
as required by the Act.
03Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-2170.01 (Cum. Supp. 1953).
4 Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 76-101 to 76-123 (Reissue 1950).
'35Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 25-207, 25-213, 40-104, 76-288 to 76-298 (Reissue
1948). See Defining Merchantable Title by Legislative Act, Rankin, 25 Neb.
L. Rev. 86 (1945).
'30Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 76-601 to 76-644 (Reissue 1950).
67 Williams, The Over Meticulous Title Examiner as a Nusiance to the
Public and to the Profession, 17 Neb. L. Bull. 98 (1938).
TITLE PROBLEMS IN OIL AND GAS IN NEBRASKA
The following are two examples of oil title problems that
have been encountered several times:
(1) A is the record title owner of section number one in
1900. He lives in New York and dies there with none of his
heirs having knowledge of his ownership of Nebraska land.
In 1905 B, an interloper without title, conveys section number
one by warranty deed to C, who goes into possession and
there remains until 1954 when he desires to execute an oil
and gas lease upon the land.
(2) A is the record title owner of section number two in
1900. A conveys to B by warranty deed in 1905 reserving
an undivided one-half of the oil, gas and other minerals. B
then conveys to C in 1910 by warranty deed which contains
no mineral reservation or exception. C goes into possession
of the land under his deed and remains in possession until
1954 when he desires to execute an oil and gas lease upon the
land.
The law appears to be well settled that where there has been
no severence of the mineral estate from the surface estate, ad-
verse possession of the surface constitutes adverse possession of
the underlying minerals and title thereto may be so acquired. On
the other hand, where there has been a severence of the mineral
estate from the surface estate, the owner of the severed minerals
does not lose his right or his possession by any length of nonuser,
nor does the owner of the surface acquire title by adverse posses-
sion or by limitations to the minerals by his exclusive and con-
tinuous occupancy and enjoyment of the surface alone. In such
a case the only way the statute of limitations can be asserted
against the owner of the minerals is for the owner of the surface
estate to take actual possession of such minerals by drilling or
some other legally recognized act of possession and continuing
such possession for the required prescriptive period.,S
Applying these rules, problem number one may be resolved
in favor of mineral ownership in C by applying either the doctrine
of adverse possession or by compliance with the requirements of
The Marketable Title Act, since in either case C has had sufficient
possession of both the surface and mineral estates. But applying
the same rules in problem number two, C could not acquire title
by adverse possession as to the severed one-half interest in the
minerals. May C acquire title to the severed one-half interest in
68 1A Summers, Oil and Gas § 138 (2d ed. 1954); Masterson, Adverse
Possession and the Severed Mineral Estate, 25 Texas L. Rev. 139 (1946);
see Notes, 93 A.L.R. 1232 (1934), 67 A.L.R. 1440 (1930) and 13 A.L.R.
372 (1921).
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the minerals by compliance with The Marketable Title Act?
It is clear that the first of the two requirements necessary to
invoke the application of the Act, i.e., unbroken chain of title for
twenty-two years, is present. But does C have possession of the
severed one-half interest in the minerals sufficient to satisfy the
second requirement of the Act? This question is apparently un-
answered in Nebraska and in states with similar statutes. There
is considerable diversity of opinion among Nebraska title exami-
ners as to the proper conclusion to be reached. It is submitted,
however, that if the reasoning of the authorities which deny ac-
quisition of title to minerals by adverse possession of the surface
is to be followed, then it seems clear that C would not have posses-
sion of the minerals sufficient to satisfy the requirement of the
Marketable Title Act.
There are very few decisions which spell out what type of
possession must be exercised over oil and gas before title to these
minerals will arise by adverse possession. The drilling of a well
and actual production has been held sufficient possession upon
which to base a title by adverse possession if such possession is
continuous over the prescriptive period. Generally the mere exe-
cution of an oil and gas lease by the surface owner, without any
drilling or operation on the land by the surface owner or his lessee,
will not constitute such acts of possession as will ripen into title
to the minerals. However, there is authority to the contrary. 69
These cases illustrate the nature of the possession of the min-
erals by the surface owner, after a prior serverence, necessary to
commence the limitation period. But under The Marketable Title
Act no future limitation period after possession is required and
no person, other than the one claiming title under the Act through
his unbroken chain of title for a period of twenty-two years or
longer, appears to be required to be in possession of the real estate.
As a suggested solution to problem number two, C could exe-
cute an oil and gas lease upon the land. Once production had been
started, he could file his affidavit of possession as required by the
Act and have some assurance that his title to the minerals would
be recognized.
It is evident, however, that with the continued development
of the oil and gas industry in Nebraska and the title problems
that are created thereby, it would be wise to amend The Market-
able Title Act so it would apply more specifically to mineral titles.
CONCULSION
The examiner of oil titles has perhaps a greater responsibility
69 1A Summers, Oil and Gas § 138 (2d ed. 1954).
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than the usual examiner of titles because on the basis of his opin-
ion large sums of money may be spent in procuring an oil and
gas lease and developing it. Mistakes and errors of title involving
$2000 on town property or $20,000 on farm property are often
rectified with little expense, inconvenience or loss of professional
dignity, but contrast this with the illustration of the oil title ex-
aminer, who, through legal error or an abstract deficiency, fails
to recognize an outstanding valid mineral ownership. The lessee
develops the land at a large expense and obtains production, the
value of which may run into astronomical figures. How then can
the error be cured?
It is not suggested that the oil title examiner should be over
meticulous but he should, by all standards, exercise greater care
in resolving reasonable doubts as to the mineral title than would
perhaps be exercised in an ordinary land title examination.
An attempt has been made to present a few of the multiple
practical problems with which an oil title examiner in Nebraska
may be confronted and to discuss possible approaches and solu-
tions, to such problems. Several cardinal principles of oil title
examinations are suggested, two of which are: (1) the advis-
ability of requiring copies of all instruments in the chain of title
affecting the title to the minerals and (2) the desirability of
having Nebraska titles examined by Nebraska lawyers who are
well acquaintanced with necessary statutes and judicial prece-
dents, who will not be unduly influenced by laws and practices
of other jurisdictions, who may readily examine original recorded
records when necessary and have knowledge of unusual local title
problems not appearing of record.
This article is therefore designed to be practical and provoca-
tive, rather than authoritative or technical; to stimulate rather
than decide and to serve as a partial guide to some of the oil title
problems properly to be considered preceding the oil and gas lease.
If it serves these purposes, even to some small extent, the writer
will be gratified.70
70 The writer is indebted to the several distinguished members of the
Nebraska Bar and counsel representing the oil industry for their sugges-
tions and comments in the preparation of this article.
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
APPENDIX
A SUGGESTED OIL AND GAS OPINION
Date:
State:
County:
Lessors:
Lease No:
X Oil Company
Denver, Colorado
Attention: A. C. Jones
DESCRIPTION:
NW 114 Section 4, Township 13 North, Range 50,
West of the 6th P. M., Cheyenne County, Nebraska.
ABSTRACTS EXAMINED:
(1) Base abstract of title to the captioned land prepared by
Cheyenne County Abstract Company, Sidney, Nebraska,
containing 44 entries and 27 pages of court proceedings,
exhibits and certificates and certified from the patent to
September 30, 1950, at 9:00 A. M.
(2) Supplemental abstract of title prepared by the same
abstracter containing 22 entries and 12 pages of court
proceedings, exhibits and certificates and certified from
September 30, 1950, at 9:00 A. M. to September 30,
1954, at 9:00 A. M.
OWNERSHIP:
(1) Surface:
John Jones and Mary Jones, Sidney, Nebraska
(2) Minerals:
John Jones and Mary Jones, Sidney, Nebraska
Z Royalty Company, Denver, Colorado
Henry Smith, Chicago, Illinois
(3) Delay Rentals and Royalties:
Same as minerals.
(4) Mineral Interest Under Lease To:
X Oil Company
(5) Overriding Royalty:
Z Oil Company 1/16 of /8 0
(6) Production Payments:
American National Bank, Sidney,
Nebraska $10,0
RRI.
00.00
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(7) Mineral Deeds:
Z Royalty Company, Denver, Colorado 1/3 of 1/8 R.I.
Henry Smith 1/3 of 1/8 R.
(8) Mortgages:
American National Bank, Sidney,
Nebraska $10,000.00
(9) Taxes:
Taxes for 1953 and all prior years paid.
(10) Reservations, Easements, Judgments, Etc.:
None.
BASE LEASE:
(1) Form:
(2) Date:
(3) Filed for Record:
(4) Lessors:
(5) Lessee:
(6) Assignee:
(7) Land Covered:
(8)
(9)
(10)
Primary Term:
Royalty:
Rental:
(11) Depository:
(12) Entirety Clause:
(13) Force Majeure
Clause:
(14) Unusual Provision
ASSIGNMENTS:
(1) Date:
(2) Filed for Record:
Assignor:
Assignee:
Lands Covered:
(6) Interest Assigned
Nebraska Producers 88-B
7-1-53.
7-7-53 Book 37, Page 483, Oil and
Gas Records of Cheyenne County,
Nebraska.
John Jones and Mary Jones, husband
and wife.
Z Oil Company
X Oil Company
NW 1/4 4-13-50 and W 1/2 2-13-50,
Cheyenne County, Nebraska.
10 years.
1/8th.$420.00 payable 7/1/54 and annually
thereafter.
American National Bank, Sidney,
Nebraska.
Yes.
Yes.
as: None.
8-1-53
8-2-53, Book 37, Page 600, Oil and
Gas Records of Cheyenne County,
Nebraska.
Z Oil Company
X Oil Company
NW 14 4-13-50 Cheyenne County,
Nebraska.
All right, title and interest subject
to reservation in favor of Z Oil Com-
pany of 1/16 of /8 ORRI.
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MORTGAGES AND PRODUCTION PAYMENTS:
(1) Date:
(2) Filed for Record:
(3) Mortgagor:
(4) Mortgagee:
(5) Lands Covered:
(6) Amount:
(7) Production Pay-
ments:
MINERAL DEEDS:
(1) Date:
(2) Filed for Record:
(3) Grantors:
(4) Grantees:
Lands Covered:
7/10/53
7/10/53, Book 100, Page 63, Mort-
gage Records of Cheyenne County,
Nebraska.
Z Oil Company
American National Bank, Sidney,
Nebraska.
All lands in base lease.
$10,000.00 due and payable five
years from date with interest at 4%
per annum.
All royalties from production due
and payable to Z Oil Company are
assigned as production payments un-
til full amount of mortgage indebt-
edness is paid in full.
7/30/53
7/30/53
John Jones and Mary Jones, husband
and wife.
Z Royalty Company 1/3 int.
Henry Smith 1/3 int.
All lands in base lease.
(6) Unusual Provisions: Grantors reserve right to execute
future leases without joinder by min-
eral owners.
Gentlemen:
From our examination of the above abstracts and documents
we find title to the lands described in the caption hereof to be as
stated, subject to the following comments, qualifications and ob-
jections:
Objection:
Requirement:
Objection:
Requirement:
This opinion does not cover the rights of persons in posses-
sion, liens for labor or materials accrued but not filed, chattel
mortgages, matters involving area or boundaries, or any other
matters not ascertainable from an examination of the above des-
cribed abstracts and documents.
Very truly yours,
